The New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries constrains the incidental capture of Hooker's sea lions in trawl nets of the southern squid fishery by closing the season once an upper limit on sea lion deaths is reached. The regulatory measure is in fact a limit on effort since the number of sea lion deaths is calculated from an estimated mortality rate per standard unit of effort measured in tows. During recent years vessels have been observed to increase the median time per tow suggesting the industry is expanding the capacity of an unregulated input in response. This paper formalises the current situation analytically by constructing a bioeconomic model that captures the idiosyncrasies of the squid fishery and the imposed regulation. Reducing the regulatory constraint to an isoperimetric problem can show how the current management regime may skew incentives leading to the observed increase in tow time. An extension to the current regulatory framework by introducing a spatial dimension to the estimated sea lion mortality rate may lead to more efficient behaviour. Despite retaining an upper limit on sea lion deaths, the profit maximising squid industry is given the incentive to increase effort in areas of high squid density relative to sea lion density.
Introduction
Harvesting activities by commercial vessels resulting in the unintended and incidental catch of marine mammals have been occurring for centuries (Read et al. 2006) . The practice of discarding captured animals dead (or mortally injured) when they have no economic value or are protected by law is known as bycatch (Hall 1996) . Read et al. (2006) estimate the global bycatch to be in the hundreds of thousands of marine mammals, primarily due to the rapid growth of fisheries worldwide over the last decade, with significant demographic effects on local marine mammal populations.
Tuna-dolphin interactions in the eastern tropical Pacific were probably one of the most widely publicised problems, where fishers set large seines on dolphins to fish on associated schools of tuna (Alverson and Hughes 1996) . The problem of bycatch is not unique to marine mammals. Other species that suffer from interactions with commercial vessels include sea birds in longline fisheries (e.g. Gilman et al. 2005) , turtles in nets and longline fisheries (e.g. Watson et al. 2005) , large sharks (e.g. Lewison et al. 2004 ) and other less charismatic species such as elasmobranches (Casey and Myers 1998) .
Aspirations to reduce the level of marine mammal bycatch rest on the FAO code of conduct for responsible fisheries (FAO 1995) , encouraging responsible and sustainable fisheries management and explicitly discouraging the practice of discarding. Operational measures to reduce bycatch are limited to either a reduction on effort or on the bycatch-per-unit effort (Hall 1996) . The former is a costly solution often imposed indirectly by enforcing spatial and temporal closures, such as in the tunadolphin programme (Hall 1998) , while the latter relates to technological changes in gear and other equipment; for example, requirements for Turtle-Excluder Devices on trawlers have had a marked positive impact on turtle mortality (Magnuson et al. 1990 ). Other measures include changes in the deployment and retrieval of fishing gear (for example deploying longlines at night reduces seabird bycatches (Loekkeborg 1998) ) and training of fishers to provide them with the information to avoid conditions favouring high bycatch levels (Hall et al. 2000) .
This paper analyses the bycatch problem of the rare Hooker's sea lion, which pursues the same prey as commercial fishers when harvesting arrow squid by trawl nets around the subantarctic islands, 350km south of the New Zealand mainland. Population levels of sea lions have dropped by more than 40% over the past 10 years with now less than 10,000 individuals of the endemic species left (Southland Times 2010) . Currently the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries constrains the incidental capture of sea lions in trawl nets by closing the fishing season once an upper limit on sea lion deaths is reached, where the calculated number of sea lion deaths is based on an estimated mortality rate per standard unit of effort. The calculation leans on measures developed in the US marine mammal management scheme where estimated bycatch rates are applied to some measure of total fishing effort to derive total bycatch levels (Read et al. 2005) .
This paper draws attention to the fact that the Ministry of Fisheries' upper limit on sea lion deaths, and in particular the calculation of this upper limit as a function of the total units of effort in a season, is in fact an indirect limit on fishing effort. The finding is in line with Hall (1998) who notes that a total bycatch limit is often a costly solution by indirectly constraining fishing effort. The squid industry has to forgo revenue streams as a result of the premature closure of the fishing season once the upper limit on sea lion deaths is reached. During recent years vessels have been observed to expand the capacity of a standard unit of effort indicating the industry may be trying to circumvent regulation rather than focus on avoiding sea lion capture.
The current situation is analysed by constructing a bioeconomic model that reflects the idiosyncrasies of the fishery. The squid fishery is best modelled by a single cohort model and the effects of regulation are analysed by reducing the regulatory constraint to an isoperimetric problem.
The model is able to show how the current management regime provides incentives leading to the observed expansion of fishing capacity. An extension to the current regulatory framework by taking spatial differences in sea lion density into consideration adds flexibility and may lead to more efficient behaviour. Despite retaining an upper limit on sea lion deaths, the profit maximising squid industry is accorded spatial flexibility in its response to the regulatory limit and given the incentive to increase harvest activity in zones of high squid density relative to sea lion density. The more effective the Ministry of Fisheries and/or squid industry becomes in integrating the spatial dimension into regulation, the greater the scope for maximising economic gains and the less pressure there will be on expanding the capacity of the defined effort unit.
Section 2 provides a brief summary of sea lions as a bycatch to the squid fishery, section 3 proposes a single cohort model to capture the characteristics of the squid fishery, section 4 illustrates the dynamic optimization problem of the squid industry, section 5 models the effects of regulation, section 6 provides policy advice by presenting a spatial model and numerical analysis, section 7 provides a short discussion and section 8 concludes.
Squid and sea lions
The squid fishery is managed by an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, New Zealand's rightsbased management response to dwindling inshore stocks since 1986. Each year the Ministry of Fisheries sets a total allowable commercial catch (TACC) in each of the 4 quota management areas (QMAs) for squid, and the ITQs are well defined rights to harvest a percentage share of this TACC.
Owners can buy (sell) parts of their ITQ holdings 1 in order to increase (reduce) their landings. The amount an owner is allowed to catch within the next fishing year is known as an annual catch entitlement (ACE). To enhance flexibility of the system, ITQ owners may lease all or part of their ACE to other fishers. The result is that anyone may enter the industry by buying ITQs or leasing ACE at any time. The underlying theory is that owners of such ITQs may trade or lease them freely in a competitive market generating price signals which provide important information on the profitability and sustainability of the fishery 2 . Figure 1 shows the squid QMAs SQU1J (jig fishing only), and SQU1T, SQU6T and SQU10T (trawl fisheries but can be jigged) (Chilvers 2008) .
[ Figure 1 near here] Squid fishing in New Zealand goes as far back as in the late 1970s, mainly by jigging. In the year ending 2008 arrow squid was one of the top 10 export species worth $NZ 71 million (SeaFIC 2010). A large fraction of this catch is derived nearly exclusively by trawl from SQU6T, an area south of the New Zealand mainland. Trawling activity focuses on waters surrounding the Auckland Islands, which 6 lie within SQU6T, due to being relatively accessible for squid vessels and leading to little finfish bycatch. The TACC for SQU6T has remained unchanged since 1997-98, however, recent management measures to protect the rare Hooker's sea lion (Phocarctos hookeri) have constrained landings (Ministry of Fisheries 2009).
The Hooker's sea lion is endemic to New Zealand with its main breeding grounds confined to the Auckland Islands (MarineBio 2009) 3 . The main food source consists of fish, squid and octopus and individuals can live up to 18 to 23 years. In New Zealand sea lions are classified as threatened species and are also listed as vulnerable on the IUCN Red List, primarily due to the limited number of breeding sites (Breen and Kim 2005) .
The operation of the fishery coincides spatially and temporally with the foraging and breeding behaviour of sea lions which prey on squid. Sea lions are most frequently caught by arrow squid trawl vessels in the SQU6T fishing grounds around the Auckland Islands and capture usually results in the drowning of the animals (Breen and Kim 2005) . The impact of the bycatch mortality on the population size is unclear; however, the Ministry of Fisheries has enacted a regulatory measure to constrain the incidental capture of sea lions, the analysis of which constitutes the main subject of this paper.
The single cohort model
The New Zealand squid fishery reflects the unique biological characteristic of the arrow squid N.
sloanii found in the south of New Zealand. Unlike other pelagic fish, N. Sloanii live for one year and exhibit rapid growth in the latter stages of their life cycle during which fishing occurs (Breen and Kim 2005) . Wilson and Soboil (2006) present a combined squid and sea lion model to test alternative management strategies for squid harvesting in New Zealand. The authors treat the squid stock as a lumped parameter problem represented by a Verhulst logistic growth function, which they couple with a "die off" function 4 to reflect the rapid death of squid once it reaches the age of one. Logistic growth presupposes a yearly standing stock where the rate of reproduction is proportional to the existing population and the amount of available resources. However, given the biological idiosyncrasies of squid, the problem is more accurately represented by the single cohort model of Beverton and Holt (1957) . All squid individuals hatch between July and August and spawn once in their lifetime in the months of June and July shortly before they die. This means every squid fishing season is based on a completely new stock with individuals of the same age (Ministry of Fisheries 2009). Fishing occurs between January and May and is conducted almost entirely by trawl with little finfish bycatch.
Recruitment is highly variable and influenced largely by environmental and oceanographic variables 5 .
This implies there is little statistical correlation between recruitment and spawning biomass and predicting yearly biomass levels is difficult (Ministry of Fisheries 2009).
Following Clark's (2005) exposition of the Beverton-Holt single cohort model and adapting it to reflect the biological characteristics of the squid fishery, the change in the number of squid, N(t), alive in a given cohort at time t can be expressed as
where M(t) represents the natural mortality rate, F(t) the fishing mortality rate, F s the rate of squid being preyed upon by sea lions and R recruitment (assumed to be a given constant). The predation effect of sea lions on squid, F s , is negligible and dropped in further analysis. Equation (1) distinguishes itself from the Beverton-Holt single cohort model by making natural mortality M(t) a time dependent variable (as opposed to some assumed constant M). This is to reflect the rapid change in natural mortality towards the end of the life cycle, where all squid die by the age of one. The total biomass of the squid cohort, B(t), is defined as
where w(t) measures the time dependent average weight of squid 6 . The natural biomass of squid, B 0 (t),
(where F(t) = 0) is given by
By differentiating equation (4) with respect to time t one can derive the age t = t 0 (here in terms of months) at which the natural biomass of squid attains its maximum value.
Equation (5) shows that, given natural mortality is assumed to be a function of time in equation (4), t 0 depends both on the rate of change of natural mortality, ‫ܯ‬ ሶ , multiplied by the number of months, t, and on natural mortality, M(t). Similar to Wilson and Soboil's (2005) representation of the rate of die off one can model M(t) as a function of age according to
where ߗ takes the value of a constant and γ a relatively large exponent so as to ensure death of all squid by month 12. In practical terms this means that the natural biomass B 0 (t) function follows a strong peak-shaped pattern with a slow take off and a sharply decreasing drop close to the end of month 12. Given that squid fishing interests are represented by the Deepwater Group, the fishers' management problem can be modelled as that of a private, single owner fishery, from here on referred to as the (squid) industry.
Dynamic optimization
The dynamic analysis of the Beverton-Holt model assuming a single owner becomes complex and analytically intractable when maximizing harvest of an age-structured population with many cohorts.
However, since every squid fishing season is based on individuals of the same age, one can resort to the simple dynamic optimization of a single cohort harvest when no regulation is imposed. Allowing Clark (2005) formulates the problem as one of maximizing the present value, PV, of the net benefits from harvest of a squid cohort discounted 9 at a rate δ as
The price of squid, p, and the cost coefficient, c, are assumed constant. The objective function (7) is maximised in continuous time with an infinite time horizon subject to equation (1), where F(t)
constitutes the control variable and N(t) the state variable. Following the standard bang-bang approach to this linear control problem, the results show that the singular solution N*(t) is not qualitatively affected by the assumption of a time dependent natural mortality rate M(t). The optimal path of squid population can be restated from Clark (2005) as
If ‫ܤ‬ ‫כ‬ ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ ൌ ܰ ‫כ‬ ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ‫ݓ‬ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ, equation (8) Given equation (6), however, the optimal biomass path, B*(t), distinguishes itself in that it intersects the natural biomass curve, B 0 , relatively late in the life cycle of the species and displays a sharp decline in line with the peak-shaped pattern of the natural biomass curve. Figure 2 trawl nets which provides an escape hole for sea lions to swim out of the net. However, the effectiveness of such escape holes is controversial (Breen and Kim 2005) .
The central question that motivates this study is whether the current regulation provides the appropriate incentives for the squid industry to avoid the capture of sea lions. If society wishes to protect sea lions as well as promote industry profitability, the cost of capturing sea lions during harvesting activities has to be internalised so that the industry can respond in an efficient manner. The following provides an indication that the current regulation fails to do so. The Ministry had to increase the strike rate from 5.3% to 5.65% in the 2008-09 season to take account of an increase in the median time per tow (Ministry of Fisheries 2008). It was observed that over a time span of three years the median tow length had increased steadily from approximately 4 hours to 5.8 hours.
This is to be expected given the way the regulation is implemented. The FRML of 113 sea lions is in fact an imposed restriction on effort; a strike rate of 5.65% implies 5.65 sea lions are presumed dead for every 100 tows 13 . It follows that an upper limit of 113 sea lions represents a maximum cumulative number of 2000 tows per season, ‫ݒ‬ҧ , which applies to the squid industry as a whole. The effect of imposing a binding restriction on effort leads to the following maximisation problem
The squid fishery, represented by the Deepwater Group Ltd., aims to maximise the net benefits from squid harvest according to equation (10) subject to the effort constraint in equation (11). Equation (10) restates equation (7) with the difference in representing the fishing mortality variable F(t) as a product of the catchability coefficient q (assumed constant) and fishing effort E(t) (Beverton and Holt 1957) .
In the case of a trawl fishery, effort E(t) can be measured by the product of the duration per tow ݄ ത and the number of tows at time t, v(t). To increase fishing efficiency trawling vessels generally maximise the standard duration per tow subject to limiting factors such as fish quality. The variable ݄ ത is assumed constant in the short term (during a fishing season) and measured by the median number of hours per tow. Effort E(t) in equation (10) is defined as
where v(t) is the control variable. The constraint in equation (11) reflects the imposed effort restriction; once the cumulative number of tows during the fishing season reaches ‫ݒ‬ҧ ൌ 2000, the fishery will be closed.
Equation (12) obliterates the usual biological constraint shown by equation (1) as long as it is binding, meaning as long as the optimal cumulative number of tows ‫‬ ‫ݒ‬ ‫כ‬ ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ ஶ that would have been undertaken in absence of regulation is bigger than the imposed effort restriction, ‫‬ ‫ݒ‬ ‫כ‬ ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ ஶ ‫ݒ‬ҧ , the 13 Vessels with SLED are given a discount rate reducing the strike rate of 5.65% to 3.67%. Virtually all squid vessels have a SLED but for the purpose of this analysis a rate of 5.65% is assumed.
problem becomes one akin to the extraction of exhaustible resources (according to the Ministry of Fisheries (2009) the FRML that has been the active constraint in the squid fishery over the last few years). The industry no longer focuses on determining the effort v*(t) that maximises equation (10) but aims to find an optimal effort path for the amount of tows determined by ‫ݒ‬ҧ in equation (11) (akin to an optimal path of exhaustible resource extraction).
The maximization of equation (10) subject to (11) is an isoperimetric problem implying a constant co-state variable ߤҧ regardless of the type of equality condition (Chiang 1992) . The Hamiltonian H is defined as
and maximised with respect to the control variable v(t) to yield the following solution
The economic interpretation of equation (14) may provide insight as to why the median tow length, ݄ ത , has been observed to increase steadily over some time. Recalling that ߤҧ is a constant, equation (14) describes the condition that the marginal net benefit of effort ሾ‫ܰ‬ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ‫ݓ‬ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ െ ܿሿ‫݄ݍ‬ ത has to grow at the rate ߜ along an optimal path. The co-state variable ߤҧ thus represents the initial value of ሾ‫ܰ‬ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ‫ݓ‬ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ െ ܿሿ‫݄ݍ‬ ത , and the industry can increase this initial value (and thus compounded profits) by increasing the value of ݄ ത . In the common solution path of exhaustible resources agents have no control over the initial condition 14 . However, in the case where effort is composed of both tow duration and tow frequency but the effort restriction only applies to the latter, the regulatory constraint sets the incentive to divert profit maximising behaviour to the expansion of median tow length. Equation (14) formally demonstrates the observed incentive to expand the capacity of an unregulated input resulting from an effort based restriction.
Policy advice 6.1 A spatial model
How can the Ministry of Fisheries implement regulation that provides the industry with the appropriate incentive to internalise the cost of sea lion capture during harvest activity? The Ministry of Fisheries has put extensive work into devising and applying the concepts of strike rate and FRML, and its efforts likely reflect society's wish to limit sea lion mortality in absolute terms. The following policy advice focuses on a solution within the existing regulatory framework that accords the industry spatial flexibility in its response to a given FRML.
Sea lion bycatch is affected by temporal variation due to feeding commitments of pups onshore.
The concentration of sea lions at sea is highest during the squid harvesting season and there is little the Ministry of Fisheries can do to change the temporal pattern of fishing behaviour without unduly constraining harvest.
However, data collected by the Ministry of Fisheries show sea lion bycatch is also affected by spatial variation (see for example Thompson and Abraham 2009 which can be interpreted as the fishing mortality per unit of effort, thus reflecting variations in density across zones (Beverton and Holt 1957) . 16 The maximisation problem of a single cohort in equation (7) in zone j at time t. Assuming a two zone model (݆ ൌ 1,2) , the industry's problem is to maximise the sum of net benefits from squid harvest across both zones.
The constraint in equation (11*) differs notably from equation (11). For a given FRML, equation
(11*) represents the constrained cumulative decrease in the sea lion population ‫ݏ‬ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ during a fishing season, ‫‬ ௗ௦ሺ௧ሻ ௗ௧ ஶ , caused by natural mortality, ݉, and sea lion fishing mortality summed across zones,
(where ߠ represents sea lion catchability). Note the term ߠ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ excludes the median number of hours per tow to reflect the fact that regulation specifies sea lion mortality as a function of tow frequency rather than tow duration. The Hamiltonian H is defined as
(15) and maximization gives
Equation (16) shows the co-state variable ߤҧ is equal to the initial value of
. The median tow length ݄ ത remains in the solution; however, the industry can increase the initial value not only in terms of ݄ ത but also by seeking out zones with high squid catchability ‫ݍ‬ relative to sea lion catchability ߠ (indicating relative densities). The numerator represents the economic rent per tow in zone j while the denominator shows the sea lion bycatch per tow, which corresponds to the Ministry of Fisheries' calculated strike rate. Variations in sea lion bycatch per tow across zones due to varying catchability ߠ can be approximated by zone-dependent strike rates.
A lower strike rate implies a higher maximum number of allowable tows (see p. 11 for derivation of implied maximum tows). It follows that for a two zone model with two different strike rates, the implied maximum will vary according to the choice of harvesting location. For example, a lower strike rate in zone 1 implies a higher maximum number of allowable tows when all harvesting activity occurs in zone 1 rather than zone 2. The choice of harvest location determines the applicable strike rate and thus the implied maximum. Based on the zone-dependent strike rates, varying combinations of cumulative tows in zones 1 ‫ݒ(‬ ଵ ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ) and 2 ‫ݒ(‬ ଶ ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ) will determine the overall effort restriction ‫ݒ‬ҧ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ሻ according to
The coefficients ܽ and ܾ are derived by the zone-dependent strike rates; ‫ݒ‬ҧ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ሻ ൌ ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ൌ ܽ when ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ൌ 0 (where ܽ represents the maximum number of allowable tows derived by the strike rate in zone 1) and ‫ݒ‬ҧ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ሻ ൌ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ൌ when ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ൌ 0 (where represents the maximum number of allowable tows derived by the strike rate in zone 2).
Taking spatial differences in sea lion density into consideration adds flexibility to an imposed FRML. The industry can actively influence the implied level of effort restriction by its choice of harvest zone. However, potential economic gains from harvesting in a 'low' strike rate-zone (implying a high maximum number of allowable tows) may be negated by lower squid densities in the same zone.
Equation (16) shows that target species and bycatch densities matter relative to each other. The ratio of economic rent per tow to sea lion bycatch per tow equates to economic rent per captured sea lion in zone j. This shows that rent maximisation under a policy of zone-dependent strike rates focuses on obtaining the highest profit per regulatory unit. The industry can increase the initial value of ߤҧ by increasing harvest activity in the zone with the highest economic rent per captured sea lion. In fact, equation (16) implies zones 1 and 2 are perfect substitutes for each other, which means rent is maximised when all of the tows are expended in the zone with the higher economic rent per captured sea lion. In practice, variables not captured in the objective function may prove prohibitive to such a corner solution but economic gains may still be made from moderate changes in the distribution of effort across zones, as shown by the following numerical analysis.
Numerical analysis
Chilvers et al. (2005) and Chilvers (2008) report that the number of trawl tows undertaken by the squid fishery varies between years, but that their locations are similar. There appear to be two dominant fishing zones within SQU6T, an area southwest of the Auckland Islands (݆ ൌ 1) and an area north/northwest of the Auckland Islands (݆ ൌ 2). Zone 1 records 44% of all tows undertaken between 2001 and 2004, leading to 39% of the total squid catch (by weight) and 28% of all recorded sea lion captures. Zone 2 represents the remaining 56% of all tows undertaken, leading to 61% of total squid catch and 72% of all sea lion captures. Kim et al. (2004) and the Ministry of Fisheries (2009) provide data on the total amount of effort (6,171 tows), squid catch (56,278 t) and bycatch (305 sea lions) in SQU6T for the corresponding time frame.
The first three rows of table 1 summarize the data on total effort, catch and bycatch and show the corresponding calculated levels for zones 1 and 2 based on the information above. The status quo column reflects the current policy of a strike rate that is invariant to space within SQU6T and serves as a benchmark. The columns for zones 1 and 2 reflect the hypothetical scenario of a policy of zonedependent strike rates.
[ Table 1 near here]
The gathered data provide the necessary information to derive numerical values for the numerator and the denominator of equation (16 These values represent the denominator in equation (16) and are representative of the strike rates. The status quo strike rate of 0.05 implies a maximum number of 1,760 allowable tows for the season, while the strike rates of 0.03 and 0.06 in zones 1 and 2 imply a maximum number of 2,766 and 1,369 tows, respectively.
The second to last row shows the values for the economic rent per captured sea lion under the status quo ($NZ 61,420) and for zones 1 and 2 ($NZ 85, 549 and $NZ 52, 036) . The potential for economic gains arising from zone-specific economic rent per captured sea lion values are shown in the last row of table 1. During a given squid fishing season between 2001 and 2004, the industry generated an average economic rent of $NZ 5,434,531 under the status quo (economic rent per tow × implied maximum number of allowable tows 22 ). Under a policy of zone-dependent strike rates, however, economic rent could have been as low as $NZ 4, 527, 340 (min.) or as high as $NZ 7,442,775 (max.), depending on the choice of harvest zone. Table 2 illustrates how this range is determined.
[ Table 2 near here] The first column shows the maximum number of allowable tows determined by equation (17). The second column shows the cumulative number of tows expended in zone 2, while the cumulative number of tows in zone 1 is a function of tows in zone 2 according to equation (18). The fourth column shows the number of tows that are expended in zone 1 as a percentage of the maximum, which 21 Total revenue and net surplus in the annual reports apply to harvest across all deepwater species, of which squid is approximately 20% in export value. The information suffices for the current example where estimating costs as any given percentage of revenue allows costs to vary spatially and enables the comaprison of economic rent under different policies. is useful when comparing the distribution of effort between policies. The last column provides the economic rent (economic rent per tow × cumulative number of tows, summed across zones).
The first row illustrates the corner solution inferred from equation (16). Economic rent per captured sea lion is higher in zone 1 and economic rent is maximised when all tows are expended in zone 1 ‫ݒ(‬ ଶ ൌ 0). In this case, the maximum number of allowable tows is implied by the strike rate in zone 1 (‫ݒ‬ҧ ൫‫ݒ‬ ൯ ൌ ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ൌ ܽ ൌ 2,766). By expending 100% of the maximum allowable tows in zone 1 the industry can generate a maximum economic rent of $ NZ 7, 442, 775 ( ൌ 2, 691 ൈ 2, 766 3, 307 ൈ 0) . Conversely, the last row shows that expending all tows in zone 2 ‫ݒ(‬ ଵ ൌ 0) leads to a number of 1,369 allowable tows (‫ݒ‬ҧ ൫‫ݒ‬ ൯ ൌ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ൌ ൌ 1,369) 23 and a minimum economic rent of $NZ 4,527,340 (ൌ 2,691 ൈ 0 3,307 ൈ 1,369).
The remaining rows illustrate varying combinations of cumulative tows in both zones, for example, the second row shows the case when 72% of all tows are expended in zone 1, leading to a maximum of 2,154 allowable tows and an economic rent of $NZ 6,165,010. For 44% of tows in zone 1 (third row), the distribution of effort corresponds to the status quo yielding an economic rent of $NZ 5,434,531. It represents the benchmark of comparison and any distribution of effort that involves less than 44% of tows in zone 1 leads to lower levels of economic rent (see fourth and last row).
Discussion
The numerical analysis exemplifies the incentives provided by a policy of zone-dependent strike rates.
Economic rent per captured sea lion in zone 1 is higher than in zone 2, and the industry can actively influence the level of implied effort restriction and economic rent by raising harvest activity in zone 1.
For any distribution of effort that involves more than 44% of tows in zone 1, the industry is able to increase average economic returns and improve on the status quo.
The numerical analysis of the two predominant fishing zones around the Auckland Islands is a very first step to illustrating the incentive mechanism. The more effective the Ministry of Fisheries and/or industry become in establishing distinct zones and devising zone-dependent strikes accordingly, the greater the scope for maximising economic gains and the less pressure there will be on expanding the capacity of unregulated inputs such as the median duration of tows. However, further issues have to be addressed to make the policy operational.
For example, the two zones in this analysis are treated as unconnected. Little is known about the ecology and movement patterns of arrow squid (Stark et al. 2005) , and intensive fishing in one zone may lead to changes in squid migration patterns and correlated sea lions densities in adjacent zones.
The numerical analysis shows that economic gains may be made from even moderate changes in the distribution of effort across zones, but such gains may vary temporally in a dynamic setting. Ideally, the zone-dependent strike rates should be moving averages that are updated periodically to reflect nontrivial changes in both squid and sea lion densities. This raises the issue of transaction costs.
Currently all commercial fishing for deepwater species are subject to detailed reporting requirements, such as date, time, starting location and finishing location of tows (lat/long), weight of target species catch/non-target catch, vessel characteristics, etc. The Ministry of Fisheries devotes substantial resources to monitoring and enforcement (observer coverage on trawl vessels has ranged from 22% to 99% since 2000 (Thompson and Abraham 2009) ) and maintains a sophisticated database with a public user face 24 . The reporting of sea lion bycatch is already a requirement; however, the interpretation and application of zone-dependent strike rates may lead to added transaction costs. An automated system that continues to update the industry about the implied maximum allowable tows based on reported catch and bycatch data may present one solution to keep transactions costs low.
The analysis rests on the simple premise of introducing a zone-dependent strike rate into the existing regulatory framework. Theoretically, the imposition of the FRML is still tied to measures of effort and subject to the perils of effort based restrictions; however, by according the industry spatial flexibility in its response to the regulatory limit the policy may offer a cost effective solution as a first step towards better fisheries management.
Conclusion
The history of fisheries management has clearly shown that input restrictions distort incentives for fishers to circumvent regulatory measures rather than focus on efficient ways to address the underlying issue of rent dissipation. The limited entry program for the British Columbia Salmon in 1968 leading to capital stuffing is just one of the many examples of overcapitalization (Wilen 2000) .
The same finding applies to the Ministry of Fisheries' upper limit on sea lions deaths, which indirectly restricts the total number of tows squid vessels may undertake during a fishing season. A bioeconomic model for sea lion bycatch captures the effects of the current regulatory framework analytically and shows that a policy of zone-dependent strike rates provides the industry with the spatial flexibility to respond to a total bycatch limit more efficiently.
In the long run, ever increasing higher spatial resolutions of harvest zones in SQU6T could prove effective in fully internalising the cost of killing sea lions to the squid fishery. Any given number of tows and resulting bycatch provides an instant sea lion mortality rate associated with a specific location that directly affects the level of implied effort restriction. Fishers have an intimate knowledge of their fishing area and the industry is given the appropriate incentive to maximise economic rent by effecting an effort distribution that avoids sea lion capture relative to squid availability. This may provide a first step towards addressing society's conflicting objectives of conservation and commercialisation. 
